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Intellectual Property as a Bargaining
Environment
Joseph Farrell, University of California, Berkeley
Executive Summary
Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity.
But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that
would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity
may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate
w i t hb r i e fd i s c u s s i o n so fp a t e n tp o o l sand standards organizations, among
others.
Property rights, including intellectual property rights (IPR), are typi-
cally best seen as a basis for negotiation, not a prescription for who ac-
tually uses what assets or ideas. How smoothly does such negotiation
work in intellectual property, what does that imply about the IPR sys-
tem’s performance, and how can we make it work better?
These issues arise at several levels. Most simply, licensing (or the
authorized sale of infringing products) is contracting in the shadow
of the right to exclude. A patent’s classical ex post deadweight loss is
thus, in a modern economic perspective, the result of negotiation fail-
ures and, thus, depends on the negotiation environment.
The same is true of losses, or gains, from patent protection in an area
of cumulative invention. If initial innovators and subsequent innova-
tors negotiate smoothly and well, cumulative invention might actually
behelped bybroad“prospect” patents. Ifnot,patentcontrolofprospects
can hinder cumulative invention (see, e.g., Kitch 1977; Scotchmer 1991).
Thus the patent system’s dynamic innovation performance, as well as its
ex post deadweight losses, hinge on the efficacy of negotiation.
If it can work well enough, a deeper ex ante negotiation might even
repair a dysfunctional intellectual property (IP) system or tailor it to an
industry. If patents are too easy to get in electronics, or too broad in
genetics research, can interested parties agree in advance to cross‐license
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law” that weakens the otherwise excessive protection given by the de-
fault rules? Even more intriguingly, what if patents are too hard to get,
ordonotlastlongenough,insomeotherindustry?Cansuchanindustry
negotiate its way to stronger IP protection?
Such negotiations, perhaps particularly the last kind, could be threat-
ening rather than promising: privately negotiated “solutions” can be
anticompetitive. Ideally, policy might try to facilitate only beneficial ne-
gotiations, but here I assume that private agreements not “caught” by
antitrust screening are mostly beneficial, so (with antitrust review in
place) it makes sense to ask how to facilitate negotiations.
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Are efficient negotiations in the shadow of IP rights difficult; do they
need facilitation? As I describe below, I think they often are. If all private
negotiations about innovation were easy, no government‐sponsored IP
system would be necessary: potential innovators and potential benefici-
aries could just negotiate private arrangements. To discuss how to facil-
itateefficientprivatenegotiation,itishelpfulfirsttoreview(briefly)what
modern economics treats as the main generic barriers to it.
I. Barriers to Efficient Negotiation
The modern economics of negotiation identifies several kinds of barrier
to efficient negotiations.
Contracting Problems
Negotiations seek to solve a problem through an agreement, or con-
tract, about how the parties will behave. If a contract cannot be en-
forced, or if key aspects of the parties’ behavior cannot be specified
in an enforceable contract, then negotiation cannot solve the problem.
Innovation policy suggests a couple of examples:
• First, market‐like mechanisms such as patents may be desirable in
part because simple reimbursement or prize contracts for research
might not well‐targetedly specify what problems should be worked
on, when, or how hard.
• Second, consider the economics of patent holdup. A contract cannot
guide past behavior, so delayed negotiations cannot fully substitute for
prompt negotiations. Even if delayed negotiations will be fully effi-
cient whenthey take place,they will generally reflect shiftsin bargaining
Farrell 40positions due to investments and commitments meanwhile. And if that
effect is anticipated, it creates inefficient incentives.
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Information Asymmetry
In the simplest bilateral negotiation between a technology user and the
holder of a known patent, modern economics attributes failure to trade
efficiently to “private” or “asymmetric” information. If, for example, a
patent holder thinks a buyer may well be willing to pay $100 for a li-
cense, but the buyer knows he is only willing to pay $50, negotiations
may fail. Even when neither party is certain of the value of a license, if
their information/ignorance is symmetric—for instance, if the value de-
pends on economic variablesthat neitheryet knows—the theory of bilat-
eral bargaining suggests that efficient outcomes are much more likely.
Information asymmetry is likely to be reduced when more informa-
tion is publicly available. Thus it would seem that ex post licensing ne-
gotiations should, on average, go more smoothly if more information
on patent validity were brought out publicly at an early stage, as per-
haps by more thorough Patent Office examination, and/or an early op-
portunity for public opposition.
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One common and intuitively difficult information problem arises
when a producer does not know with whom it must negotiate concern-
ing patents. One might call this a “potential‐patent thicket,” as distinct
fromthe“actual‐patentthicket”thatcancreatemultiple‐marginalization
problems when many patents are known to be infringed by a product. If
a technology user cannot even list the patent holders who can block its
product, negotiation will be very difficult.
Large Numbers and Holdout
Negotiations that fundamentally involve many players are difficult. By
this I mean negotiations in which many participants must cooperate for
a common goal—as, for instance, a patent pool involving many patent
holders—as distinct from a cluster of many fundamentally bilateral
deals, as when a single patent holder licenses its patent to many users.
Fundamentally multilateral negotiations are difficult for two reasons
that interact in a subtle fashion. This is an aspect of the economics of
bargaining that, while no doubt well understood by bargaining experts,
is not a core part of economists’ general education as the contracting
and information issues are.
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bargaining) a successful negotiation requires unanimity or whether par-
tial accords can be implemented. If nothing will be done without full
participation, then each player will compare his proposed payoff under
an agreement versus the status quo. If the agreement increases partici-
pants’ total surplus, then there is a way to divide up the gains so as to
make everyone better off and command unanimous assent. The diffi-
culty then arises because of information problems: even if we know that
joint surplus increases, it may be hard to find that way to make every-
one better off. A symmetric draft agreement that divides the gains
equally will command unanimous assent only if the gains per partici-
pant exceed the maximum among the N participants’ costs of participa-
tion. This order statistic is likely to be well above the average, and
agreement may very well fail even though the total gains easily exceed
N times the average cost of participation.
What if a proposed agreement is structured so as to be less fragile,
more robust, than that? What if it is set up with the hope that all N will
participate, but if not, an incomplete agreement with only N  1 partic-
ipants is on the cards? Then the incentive condition for it to be an equi-
librium for everyone to join in is no longer that the proposed agreement
is better for all than the status quo. Now, the condition is that the pro-
posed agreement is better for each player than having the other N  1
players implement an incomplete agreement. When a partial agreement
benefits the nonparticipating (holdout) player, then this condition is
harder to satisfy than the simple “benefits all relative to status quo”
condition. As a result, a full agreement might be impossible if partial
agreements would occur. We will see some IP examples below. Diplo-
macy in fundamentally multilateral negotiations, when partial agree-
ments benefit nonparticipants, can thus involve persuading everyone
that he is pivotal (no agreement will occur without him), and either
being skilled at finding the way to make everyone better off than the
status quo or else arranging that, despite appearances, not everyone
is in fact pivotal, so that a partial agreement might be rescued.
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In the following sections I discuss three private patent institutions: pa-
tent pools, standard‐setting organizations, and prospective cross‐licenses
or grantbacks. One can view each as a privately negotiated response to a
d y s f u n c t i o ni nh o wt h ed e f a u l tp a t e nt policy operates in a particular
zone. I discuss how public policy might help such an institution over-
come bargaining problems that it faces. I also ask whether we can draw
broader policy lessons from the fact that private parties are motivated to
build these institutions. I then address whether negotiations to privately
Farrell 42strengthen patent protection are fundamentally different from negotia-
tions to privately weaken it.
II. Patent Pools
When multiple patents controlled by different owners bear on a prod-
uct, there will generically be a multiple‐marginalization problem. If
each patent owner negotiates a royalty with producers of the product,
the result will tend to be a total royalty higher than the patent holders
collectively would prefer. Multilateral negotiation could produce a bet-
ter result for them—and the producers and downstream customers pre-
sumably would also prefer it, since it involves a lower royalty.
Sometimes (the prospect of) this dysfunction prompts the formation
of a patent pool.
5
Patent pools face bargaining problems. An obvious one is a private‐
information problem: each participant might claim that its patent is
worth more than others’, but it will be difficult to negotiate who should
get how much (and indeed patent pools sometimes instead adopt a
rule of thumb, such as payouts proportional to the number of patents
contributed).
As our discussion of multilateral negotiations suggests, another prob-
lem arises if potential members do not believe they are pivotal. In fact,
patent pools often include only some, not all, of the patents needed for
a product: apparently potential participants often are not pivotal. If a
patent holder does not expect to be pivotal, its reservation payoff in or-
der to join a pool that it expects to attract all others is its “dream” value
of setting its preferred royalty while others rein theirs in. (This is akin to
the oligopolist’s dream payoff of having its rivals form a cartel and raise
their prices, with no obligation to limit its own.) It can—and, in the
symmetric case, must—be impossible to create enough joint surplus
to give each patent holder this dream payoff. If so, a full patent pool
is either infeasible or fragile (not robust to small‐scale defections). Note,
moreover, that the royalty‐stacking problem is apt to be most severe
when there are many separate patent owners, which is also where
the negotiation problems in forming a private patent pool are apt to
be most severe.
Policy Responses?
If patent pools (subject to manageable antitrust scrutiny) are beneficial
but face significant bargaining obstacles, is the right policy response
Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment 43simply to permit those that successfully form? Perhaps policy could go
further and help overcome those obstacles.
As usual, one expects that private information, perhaps especially
about the set of relevant patents, will hinder efficient bargaining, and
large numbers make for a harder problem through the order‐statistic
effect. Generic policy implications include patent clarification and limit-
ing unnecessary patents.
Policy might try to address the holdout problem either (a) by making
participants feel more likely to be pivotal or (b) by otherwise trying to
hold holdout payoffs closer to the no‐agreement benchmark.
a. An obvious policy concern with this strategy is that, when there is
also private information, it is not clear that we should try to make ben-
eficial agreements fragile. However, it seems worth considering at least
making covert holdout difficult by publicly clarifying the set of relevant
patents (both clarity of the rights and clarity of the list of rights
holders). Clarity of patent rights could be improved, as Bessen and
Meurer (2007) argue.
b. Obviously many policies could limit a holdout’s payoff, but merely
aiming to lower that payoff would be too blunt an approach. Rather,
the idea would be to bring it closer to a level commensurate with the
patent’s normal value, eliminating only the incremental gain from
holdout. Implementing this idea would be difficult (and no doubt
raise other problems) but perhaps not impossible. Thus, suppose that
a partial patent pool forms and ameliorates a royalty stacking or trans-
actions cost problem, so that a producer can license many of the
relevant patents for a modest sum and with one transaction. Now sup-
pose that a holdout patent holder who chose not to join the pool sues
a producer for patent infringement and wins. How should damages
be calculated? A patent holder has a holdout incentive to stay out of
the pool if its prospective damages are based on the pool‐boosted
success of the product; this could be neutralized if damages are in-
stead based on an estimate of sales if there had been no pool, giving
the patent holder incentives to join as if it were pivotal, even if it
were not.
6
A different approach to holdout problems is used in some other areas
of law and policy such as land law and corporate finance. In land law,
the concept of “eminent domain” is sometimes used—with much‐
debatedsafeguards,tobesure—sothataprojectthatneedsalargechunk
of land can acquire some of it through compulsory purchase and not be
Farrell 44vulnerable to holdout or to holdup. In corporate finance, when a raider
acquires a sufficient share of a firm, it may be able to force remaining
shareholders to sell (see, e.g., Yarrow 1985).
These would be attempts to smooth the private negotiations. Another
response could be to learn. This is not perhaps as simple as it sounds. If
we observe partly successful negotiations, an optimist may conclude
that, while royalty stacking might in principle be a problem, behold:
the market finds a solution—perhaps incomplete, but perhaps that just
suggests that the residual problem is small. A pessimist may conclude
that the problem is only imperfectly subject to privately negotiated so-
lutions. Both inferences make some sense. It is true that large gains from
trade, other things equal in the relevant sense, are more likely to over-
come bargaining problems. It is also true that the royalty‐stacking prob-
lem is most severe when both the number of patent holders and the
impact of each one on demand are greatest, making the negotiation
especially hard. A sensible response might be to recognize that the pri-
vate solution is unlikely to be perfect and to minimize the burden put
on it, for instance, by limiting the number of patents.
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III. Standard‐Setting Organizations
Standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) and their members can face prob-
lems when it is belatedly learned that a compatibility standard in-
fringes a patent. License negotiation ex post (after commitments to a
standard are made) is often a poor substitute for the more appropriate
ex ante negotiation (see, e.g., Lemley and Shapiro 2007). This problem
is not unique to standard setting but can be particularly severe there.
There are likely to be consumer benefits when SSOs try to address the
problem.
8 But in doing so the SSO is constrained both by contracting
problems and by negotiation constraints.
One contracting problem is, again, identifying with whom agree-
ments are needed. Another is to specify who should search how hard
for potentially relevant patents and what should be disclosed when.
Perhaps the most fundamental is that tradition and concerns about anti-
trust liability encourage the use of bilateral licensing negotiations, while
the choice of a standard is inherently a predominantly collective choice.
Thus there is a mismatch between the locus of licensing negotiations
and the ability to substitute among technological alternatives. This mis-
match, among other forces, encourages the substitution of a commit-
ment to “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” licensing terms for more
Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment 45specific ex ante negotiations. But a commitment to “RAND” raises prob-
lems of contract interpretation ex post.
The negotiation constraints, somewhat as in the holdout problem
with patent pools, arise from the fact that a patent holder may well
be able to get a nonparticipation payoff that exceeds the payoff it would
get under the fully efficient arrangement. In the standards instance, it
would do so by avoiding membership obligations (quitting, or not join-
ing, the SSO, for instance) and hoping, or maneuvering, for the stan-
dard to be covered by its patent and to be entrenched before it
negotiates licenses. A voluntary membership organization cannot then
contract into the fully efficient arrangement: that would risk a refusal to
“participate” by patent holders. Their participation constraint, in the
language of the economics of bargaining, constrains the agreement
away from the first‐best.
Policy Responses?
If this is a good description of what SSOs are wrestling with, what
might policy do?
9 Antitrust agencies could helpfully calm SSOs’ argu-
ably overblown antitrust fears about collective ex ante royalty negotia-
tion. Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
have taken steps in this direction.
Courts could also try to clarify the meaning and enforcement of the
“reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) policies adopted by
many SSOs, when patents subject to that promise are litigated. In the
spirit of the Georgia‐Pacific rule on reasonable royalties, the right con-
cept presumably is the royalties that would have been negotiated be-
tween a willing licensor and the willing members of a willing SSO at the
timethechoicetousea(potentially)infringingtechnologywasmade.
10As
in the suggestion above about damages in cases involving an incomplete
patent pool, the motivating idea is to allow for normal negotiations but
stripped of the holdout/holdup element. This could be viewed as simply
contract interpretation where there is a “RAND promise.”
But the learning perspective suggests a case for going further. If the
members of an SSO agree to address holdup by requiring disclosure
and RAND promises, what might public policy learn from that? The
optimist’s learning perspective might be that this is the “market solu-
tion” and need only be narrowly enforced. The less optimistic (and, I
think more credible) inference is that this is as far as the SSO feels able
to go in dealing with a significant problem, given perceived antitrust
constraints and the voluntary nature of the SSO. By recognizing the
Farrell 46problem and limiting patent holdup by nonparticipants (or by partici-
pants exploiting gaps in the rules), outside policy could not only per-
haps improve outcomes in the instance but also empower an SSO to
craft rules that more fully address the problem.
These ideas, whatever their practical merits or demerits, illustrate
conceptually how policy responses can go beyond merely permitting,
when a private arrangement seems beneficial but is constrained by bar-
gaining problems. One might learn from the private arrangement some-
thing about the nature or severity of the problem or about possible
techniques to address it. Relatedly, one might try to improve the pros-
pects for successful bargaining by improving information, improving
contractibility, and limiting the extent to which holdout parties can ex-
ploit the problem—especially the extent to which their ability to do so
might be enhanced by others’ partial solutions.
IV. Negotiating IP Downward
Here I briefly describe three cases in which private parties sought to
weaken the effects of default patent policy on a going‐forward basis.
Many observers think that the historic pattern of broad cross‐licensing
in the electronics industry (see, e.g., Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Shapiro
2004) was a helpful response to the patent thicket problem and regret
that it has weakened in the face of the greater bargaining challenges
that arise when there are more, and a more open‐ended set of, players.
Yet a superficially similar arrangement among auto manufacturers in
pollution control technology was challenged by the Department of Jus-
tice.
11 Finally, I comment on the FTC’s challenge to parts of Intel’s in-
tellectual property policy.
Cross‐Licensing in Electronics
In the electronics industry, many think that patents are as apt to hinder
innovation as to promote it. For some time, major established players
largely neutralized some aspects of the patent system among them-
selves by agreeing to broad cross‐licenses: I’ll call this their Big Deal
(see, e.g., Parchomovsky and Wagner 2005). They were thus able to de-
sign products (including innovating) with much less role for intellectual
property than under the default rules.
Many observers think the Big Deal has broken down—not completely,
butsubstantially.Fromabargainingpointofview,twoplausiblehypoth-
eses might help explain how such a system would break down.
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compatible, each participant must value the resulting “design freedom”
more than its alternatives. If the alternative were an efficient reward to its
patents, this fact would merely constrain the Big Deal to giving each piv-
otal participant more than its status quo payoff, which would be a test for
efficiency, and togiving each nonpivotalparticipantmore than its alterna-
tivepayoff,whichcouldbemoredemandingthantheefficiencytest,much
asitwasinthepatentpoolcontext.Butafurtherholdoutproblemwiththe
Big Deal arises if there is also a holdup problem, as discussed in the
standard‐setting context. Then, a nonmanufacturing patent holder
cangetmorethanitspatent’sinherentvalue bydeclining toparticipate.
Open‐ended set of participants. Negotiating with a heterogeneous set of
rivals may be difficult, but one would expect that it would be even
more difficult to negotiate when new participants may show up unex-
pectedly at any time. Intuitively, one does not know whom one has to
negotiate with.
12 This makes it hard to achieve the “design freedom”
that the Big Deal provided among insiders.
Cross‐Licensing in Automotive Pollution Control
While many observers regret the decline of the Big Deal in electronics,
the Justice Department sued a group of automobile manufacturers who
had agreed on such apolicy in pollution control equipment, on the grounds
that the agreement eliminated competition among them in developing
such equipment.
13 However, in 2001, FTC Chairman Pitofsky described
this as the only federal government challenge to a research joint ven-
ture since the passage of the Sherman Act, suggesting that, while liberal




ers if they sued Intel for infringing their patents. FTC Chairman Pitofsky
described the case as follows.
In one of the most widely noted antitrust enforcement actions involv-
ing intellectual property, the Commission in 1998 issued a complaint
against the Intel Corporation alleging that it was a monopolist in the
microprocessormarketandthatithadsoughttomaintainitsdominance
Farrell 48by denying essential technical information and product samples of
new microprocessors to companies that, because of intellectual prop-
erty disputes, had initiated or threatened to initiate litigation against
Intel or Intel’sc u s t o m e r s .I n t e l ’s goal, according to the complaint,
was to coerce other companies not to resort to the courts, but instead
to license their intellectual property on terms favorable to Intel. Intel
had previously provided the information and samples to many of its
customers and customer‐competitors, but withdrew these advan-
tages from those who found themselves in IP disputes with Intel.




hold product or technical information for reasons relating to an intel-
lectual property dispute. The Commission agreed to qualify this
provision however, by acknowledging that an intellectual property
holder, including a monopolist like Intel was alleged to be, is free
not to license its product or information in the first instance, but
ought not to be able to curtail its supply when the customer seeks
to vindicate its intellectual property rights through a range of legal
and equitable remedies. Intel was also free to discontinue a license
when a customer or competitor sought an injunction against Intel’s
sale of its microprocessors. The order gave the challenger a choice
of waiving that remedy, or, if it refused to waive, allowed Intel to dis-
continue providing information or product.
Thegoal of the orderwas to avoida “compulsory licensing” regime,
even by an alleged monopolist, because of the adverse effects of such
regimes on innovation. The order was designed to allow Intel and its
challengerstovindicate their rightsincourt before an independentad-
judicator, rather than resort either to self‐help (by Intel) in which case
the strong would almost always vanquish the weak, or to the kind of
injunction (by Intel’s challenger) that would threaten Intel’s ability to
conduct its business.
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V. Negotiating IP Upward
The privately negotiated departures from default rules above are in the
direction of less protection, more ex post competition, and perhaps less
ex ante incentive to get patents. What about negotiations in the opposite
direction—negotiations to strengthen or create “intellectual property”?
In general, I think, public policy takes a more skeptical view of such ne-
gotiations than of negotiations in the direction of less protection.
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protection should be longer and stronger than it is and agreed that
(a) none of them will challenge the validity of any patent held by an-
other and (b) none will infringe another’s expired patent until it has
been expired for at least 5 years.
• Or suppose that the largest airlines agreed that, to encourage the “in-
novation” of flying new routes, they would create a private patent‐like
policy: none would enter a “new” route on which another was offering
nonstop service, perhaps defining a “new” route as one on which no
such service was offered as of the date of the agreement.
Suchagreementswouldofcoursefaceaprivatenegotiationproblemin
that nonsignatories could challenge patents or decline to respect the pro-
longed patent life or the airline route agreement. Thus it would probably
not be profitable for a small subset of firms that collectively lack market
power to negotiate such an agreement, even if IP really is too weak in
their industry to the detriment of profits as well as welfare.
If a group of firms who were not too concerned about outsiders were
to reach such an agreement, on the other hand, this agreement would
likely be treated as an antitrust violation because it limits ex post
competition—even though it could strengthen incentives to innovate.
As both ex post competition and ex ante incentives to innovate are good
for consumers, why should we view negotiated departures from Con-
gress’s default balancing in one direction much more suspiciously than
in the other?
One possible answer is that we do not. Private policies have been at-
tacked for weakening IP, in the motor manufacturers case and in the
FTC’s complaint against Intel. And one can view some antitrust justifi-
cations for exclusive dealing as strengthening incentives to “invest,”
perhaps in innovation, by agreeing to limit ex post competition (see,
e.g., Segal and Whinston 2000). Despite these comebacks, however, I
think the general trend stands.
Another possible answer is that such deals are often applied to a sub-
stantial installed base, not only prospectively, so that they have more of
the adverse ex post effect than of the potentially beneficial ex ante effect.
For example, the hypothetical pharmaceutical deal might apply to ex-
isting patents as well as to new research.
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A more intriguing possible answer would be that we should not
think of the default rules as correctly (or congressionally) calibrated for
theaverageindustryorenvironment.Despitebargainingdifficulties,pri-
vate parties may well be better able to weaken IP by contracting‐around
Farrell 50than to strengthen (or introduce) IP by contracting‐around. Or, it might
be about equally easy to do, but significantly easier for competition pol-
icy to diagnoseas beneficial or not. If so, then up to a point it might make
sense for the default policy to be calibrated not as an attempt to approx-
imate the best overall policy but as something distinctly biased toward
strong protection and to allow, and/orexpect, many privateweakenings
but few strengthenings.
VI. Conclusion
Private arrangements, both short‐run (licensing an existing patent) and
longer‐run, in the shadow of patent law can be beneficial. The conven-
tional approach permits these (unless they seem harmful) but does not
actively try to help them come to fruition. Because private negotia-
tions often face significant bargaining difficulties, modern bargaining
theory suggests scope for policy to smooth their way. We can also learn
about policy tradeoffs from both successful and unsuccessful private
negotiations.
Endnotes
I thank Pamela Samuelson, Carl Shapiro, and the editors for helpful com-
ments, and the editors for their patience.
1. The assumption that, with manageable antitrust screening, most agree-
ments in the shadow of IP rights are beneficial is implicit in the approach sug-
gested by the FTC/DOJ Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
2. Some policy commentators suggest that only “surprise” holdup is a prob-
lem: if its victims know that holdup is likely, they know what they are getting
into, so the law need not assist them. Cases in which holdup actually occurs are
indeed cases in which one possible adverse effect of the prospect of holdup,
namely, the victims choosing not to develop products or standards, has not
happened (although development might have been delayed or less ambitious
than otherwise). But other interim investments may well have been deterred.
By contrast, it is not so easy to identify specific impacts on economic efficiency
of holdup that is truly a surprise, except that what is a surprise this time will
change people’s expectations of what may happen next time.
3. A separate point is the one I make with Carl Shapiro (2008), that the terms
and structure of licenses successfully negotiated under symmetric uncertainty
about patent validity may also be problematic.
4. This does not, of course, tell us what will happen, but it does imply that a
broad agreement is hard to sustain.
5. For a recent study of patent pools, see Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole (2007).
6. This would surely be error prone, but if the goal is to repair the bargaining
incentives, it would be enough to get the holdout’s expected payoff right. Mak-
ing each patent holder’s holdout payoff equal to what it would be if there were
Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment 51no pool should (in theory) ensure that there will be pool shares and prices that
make the pool attractive to all members of any set S of patent holders if and
only if there are joint gains to the formation of a pool containing S. However,
subtle issues of coalition formation may also arise, so at this point I would
regard the idea in the text as a hypothesis or conjecture to be worked out.
7. Patent pools of course can be anticompetitive, at least if the patents are
substitutes rather than complements, so it is also sensible to think of limiting
the number necessary as well as their scope and complexity, to facilitate anti-
trust review if nothing else. Improvements in patent quality would presumably
help along these lines.
8. For discussions of standard‐setting organizations’ policies, see, e.g., Lemley
(2002), Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007), or Farrell et al. (2007). As noted in that
article, I have consulted in this area and continue to do so.
9. I do believe that generally this is what is going on. But it is worth keeping
in mind that an SSO could potentially become a “rogue” organization, acting
either as an inefficiently monopsonistic technology buyers’ cartel or as a tool of
collusion against downstream customers. Thus simply giving SSOs much more
power might not be a good answer.
10. The Georgia‐Pacific decision talks about a hypothetical negotiation at the
time that infringement began. In the standards context this may be quite differ-
ent from when the choice was effectively made, but it seems to me that the core
logic favors looking at the time of choice, not of first legal infringement.
11. This is a case from the 1960s and was settled rather than fully litigated,
but the department cited the case in its 1995 Guidelines.
12. In a different context, it may be hard to find rights holders for copyrights
on old books. Apparently it is not unusual for copyright to revert to an author
when a publisher allows a book to remain out of print, but authors may be
dead or hard to locate.
13. United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Association, 307 F. Supp. 617, 618
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (approving consent decree settling charges of conspiracy “to
eliminate competition in the research, development, manufacture and installa-
tion of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment” in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act), aff’d in part and appeal dismissed in part, 397 U.S. 248
(1970).
14. For a different angle, see Shapiro (2004).
15. Some nonhypothetical deals under which a pharmaceutical patent holder
pays a potential entrant to stay out have been challenged by the FTC. These
of course are in the first instance ex post deals, with a less clear link to ex ante
incentives.
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